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Introduction 
‘Creative industries’ and ‘cultural industries’ are terms that tend to be used 
interchangeably by UK policymakers. However their meanings and uses are in fact 
very different. In this paper we will be exploring the differences between the two and 
arguing that, despite how influential it has become, the creative industries definition 
adopted by the British government is ill conceived in relation to culture. 
First, it confuses or conflates culture and creativity, two quite different concepts. This 
is partly because of terminological confusion about the word culture, which we will 
look at later in more detail. Second, we argue that the UK creative industries definition 
is wedded to notions of the knowledge economy, within which culture is valued 
primarily for its economic contribution. The result is a creative industries definition 
that fails to take account of the importance and distinctiveness of culture – in policy 
terms the creative arts have been subsumed within a concept which, as we shall show, 
has no cultural content at all. 
                                                     
1  An extended version of this paper will appear in the International Journal of Cultural Policy 13.1 
(2007). 
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While a lot of the arts world is very pleased to be included in the creative industries, 
there is also uneasiness about where the arts sit within these. This has been presented 
as the arts’ distaste for the world of commerce – in other words a tension between the 
subsidised and the commercial (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt). We think this is over-
simplistic. The economy of the arts is mixed: the publicly funded and commercial have 
a complex inter-relationship and UK cultural policymakers have engaged with this 
reality for years. It is a naïve idea that this is something the creative industries agenda 
has thrust upon them. 
In our view the uneasiness is more because of the perception that the rationale for 
publicly funding culture, and more narrowly, the arts, is being undermined. We will 
present this argument and look at some of the implications for cultural policy of the 
creative industries concept. First, we will look at what the different notions cultural 
industries and creative industries represent in policy terms. We will then turn to the 
differences between the two definitions, in particular comparing the complexity of 
Throsby’s definition of the cultural industries, with the official UK definition of the 
creative industries (Throsby, Economics). 
 
Origins of the Two Terms 
Adorno and Horkheimer originally coined the term cultural industry to make the 
distinction between the traditional artisan based creative arts and industrially produced 
cultural forms (Dialectic of Enlightenment). The arts were specifically not part of the 
cultural industries. The term ‘cultural industries’ which developed from this – referring 
to the ‘classic’ cultural industries of film, recorded music, broadcasting and publishing 
– was deployed to incorporate these forms of commercial entertainment, mass 
produced by industrial methods, as an object of government cultural policy. This was 
the sense in which the cultural industries became a subject of interest to the French 
government, and to UNESCO in the late 1970s and 1980s (Garnham; Towse, Cultural 
Economics; Flew). 
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By adopting the phrase ‘creative industries’ Britain’s New Labour government were 
doing the reverse: in other words bringing the creative arts into an economic policy 
agenda. New Labour purposefully adopted the term creative industries to replace 
‘cultural industries’ because it was regarded as a ‘unifying’ and ‘democratising’ 
notion. As a rhetorical device, it bridges the divide between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture – 
between the mass market, popular cultural products of the cultural industries and the 
high art of the creative arts, now branded ‘elitist’. It also bridges the divide between 
‘art’ and ‘industry’ – between the demarcations of what is ‘publicly supported’ and 
what is ‘commercial’. It thereby provides a holistic approach to cultural production in 
its entirety, overcoming, at least conceptually, the traditional division of responsibility 
for culture within UK government, split between the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Department responsible for Culture – previously Education, then 
DNH and now the DCMS. 
It has been described by Andy Pratt and others as representing the ‘re-branding’ of 
culture by the New Labour government (Flew; Caust; Pratt, The Cultural Economy). 
The question we raise is whether this is simply a change in language, a branding 
exercise, or whether it signals a more significant change in policy approach to culture.  
 
Definitions 
The terminological clutter that surrounds the term culture is to some extent 
responsible, in our view, for the failure to adequately consider the differences between 
cultural and creative activities. In particular, there is an assumption that there is 
nothing distinctive about creativity in the cultural sphere. Most definitions of the 
cultural industries are based around a combination of five main criteria – creativity, 
intellectual property, symbolic meaning, use value, and methods of production. 
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Creativity  
Cultural and creative industries are often described as those that are based upon 
individual creativity, and creativity is the key ingredient in official UK documents (see 
below). However, this would seem, almost tautologically, to define the ‘creative 
industries’, since any activity that involves creativity would necessarily be ‘creative’ 
(Pratt, Cultural Industries 33). Defining ‘creative industries’ against such a measure is, 
if nothing else, far too wide to be useful for any purpose. Any innovation – including 
scientific and technical innovations – of any sort in any industry is creative, and, in 
such terms, any industry is, therefore, potentially a ‘creative industry’. Conflating 
cultural creativity with all other forms of creativity fails to take adequate account of 
important differences between cultural and creative industries, a point we address 
below. 
 
Intellectual Property 
Intellectual property allows people to own the products of their creativity and therefore 
to exercise both economic and moral rights over these products. Towse comments that 
in the UK, copyright is now viewed as the ‘organising principle’ for the creative 
industries and is the basis for defining the cultural industries (The Cultural Industries 
170).  
However, it is equally clear that defining creative industries by their ability to generate 
intellectual property runs up against the same problem as defining them by using 
‘general’ creativity – many types of creative activity, including science, engineering, 
and academia, generate intellectual property. We also believe that defining the cultural 
sector by its ability to generate intellectual property is again too wide-ranging, since it 
again fails to identify adequately the distinctive aspects of the cultural sector.  
We should recognise that advocates of the ‘knowledge economy’ model, such as 
Howkins (Speech to the Inception Session), do argue that the term ‘creative industry’ 
should apply to any industry where ‘brain power is preponderant and where the 
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outcome is intellectual property’ (Howkins 2). They argue, on this basis, that the 
boundaries of official DCMS definitions (the UK government Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport, DCMS) should be extended to include both business and scientific 
creativity.  
This ‘everything is creative’ argument also underlies the UK government’s approach 
to creative industries, which it defines as 
those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill 
and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation 
through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property.2
There is a sharp conflict between this view, which sees cultural production as just one 
type of creativity, and the alternative view that culture and cultural products are 
something distinctive. For adherents of the latter view, however, definitions based on 
concepts of creativity and/or intellectual property alone do not adequately explain 
what is ‘cultural’ about the ‘cultural’ or ‘creative’ industries. These writers place value 
on a third concept, ‘symbolic meaning’.  
 
Symbolic ‘Goods’ or ‘Symbolic Meaning’ 
The ‘everything is creative’ approach is opposed by writers who place value on the 
concept of ‘symbolic meaning’. For these commentators, the generation, or 
communication, of symbolic meaning is the defining concept of culture and the 
economic value of goods is derived from, or reflects, their cultural value. In his 2001 
study, Economics and Culture, Throsby examined the etymology of the term ‘culture’. 
Drawing on the work of Raymond Williams (Keywords; Culture), he showed that, 
while it was originally defined in terms of cultivating the soil, the meaning of culture 
was later refined to encompass individual intellectual and artistic cultivation: it is for 
                                                     
2  Creative Industries Mapping Document prepared for the DCMS Creative Industries Task Force, 
October 1998.  
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this reason that we continue to refer to a person who is conversant in the arts as 
‘cultivated’ (Throsby 3). In its original sense, therefore, culture was used to describe 
activities that contributed to the intellectual and artistic development of individuals.  
However, during the nineteenth century the use of the term ‘culture’ was expanded, 
and it began to be applied in a wider sense, to describe the set of beliefs held in 
common by different societies. In the context of nineteenth-century nation building in 
particular, the term began to refer particularly to the development of individual 
nations. It thus evolved from describing the intellectual development of the individual, 
and began to be applied to describing features such as the belief system, customs, 
expressions, and so on, of a people or society. Subsequent development of this latter 
usage simply extends this definition further, and it has come to be used at a more 
micro level to describe a set of attitudes, expressions and customs common to or 
shared by groups within societies. For example, we now commonly talk about a ‘drug 
culture’, ‘youth culture’, and, at the very micro level, even of companies having a 
‘corporate culture’.  
However, it is also clear that, whatever group of people within society is under 
discussion, producing culture is essentially about generating and communicating some 
type of meaning. Thus O’Connor defines the cultural industries as ‘those activities 
which deal primarily in symbolic goods – goods whose primary economic value is 
derived from their cultural value’ (O’Connor 5). This definition, then, includes what 
O’Connor calls the ‘classical’ cultural industries – broadcast media, film, publishing, 
recorded music, design, architecture, new media – and the ‘traditional arts’ – visual 
art, crafts, theatre, music theatre, concerts and performance, literature, museums and 
galleries – all those activities which have been eligible for public funding as ‘art’ 
(O’Connor 5). 
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Use Value 
Others, including Bilton and Leary (What can managers do) and Martin (Defining 
Culture), while agreeing on the importance of symbolic meaning, differ from 
O’Connor by considering a fourth concept, that of ‘use value’ to be the defining 
characteristic. Symbolic goods and services have as ‘first use’ the communication of 
ideas, rather than a functional value. So while activities which produce books, films, 
plays, music are part of the cultural industries, those such as fashion design, 
advertising and architecture, where there is symbolic content, but where functionality 
comes first, are not considered to be part of the cultural industries.  
Throsby (Economics and Culture) presents a definition that combines all three 
concepts looked at so far, and also incorporates the issue of ‘use value’, allowing 
consideration of both the economic and cultural sides of the cultural industries. He 
argues that:  
1. the activities of the cultural industries involve some form of creativity in their 
production; 
2. the cultural industries are concerned with the generation and communication of 
symbolic meaning; and, 
3. their output embodies, at least potentially, some form of intellectual property.  
Taking the first two conditions together would seem to define the cultural industries. 
The first condition means that the activity involves some type of creativity, while the 
second limits this to symbolic meaning, importantly excluding the generation of 
scientific or functional knowledge. In Throsby’s view all three conditions are 
necessary to decide whether an industry is part of the cultural industries, and while 
they provide a clear set of criteria for doing so, in practice there are considerable 
difficulties involved in deciding whether, and to what extent, individual activities are 
‘cultural industries’. 
Throsby extends his analysis to define a three-fold classification of cultural industries. 
At the centre of this industry model lie creative arts such as music, dance, theatre, 
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literature, visual arts, crafts, plus newer forms such as video art and multimedia. He 
argues that the principal purpose of these industries is to generate and/or communicate 
meaning about the intellectual, moral and/or spiritual behaviour of the individual 
and/or the beliefs, values, norms, and other expressions of groups in society. We may 
disagree about the extent to which individual productions achieve this end, but these 
industries should properly be defined within the cultural sector because generating and 
communicating meaning is the main output of each.  
Throsby next extends his approach to include a wider set of activities centred on the 
creative arts, and it is at this point that difficulties begin to appear with regard to the 
proper definition of culture. He broadens his definition in two ways. The first involves 
extending the boundaries of the cultural industries to include industries that operate 
essentially outside the cultural sphere, but where some cultural input into final 
production may be required. Advertising, design and architecture, for example, in 
addition to producing culture as discussed above, may also in some instances use 
material drawn from the creative arts as inputs into final products. In doing so, it could 
thus be argued that they generate and communicate symbolic meaning. 
This, however, suggests that culture is used as an input into the production process of 
other industries. If, for example, an advertising campaign uses a reference taken from a 
painting, then it uses the output of a cultural industry to produce its own output. 
Industries that use cultural output may thus help to propagate culture, but since they do 
not themselves produce culture, they are not a part of the cultural industries. 
Throsby’s second extension is to include industries that produce goods which involve 
some degree of cultural output, but where it is difficult to ascertain the proportion of 
cultural and non-cultural output – in economic terminology, these activities produce 
‘joint goods’, and it is at this point that more substantial difficulties begin to appear 
with regard to the proper definition of culture. 
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Joint Goods  
This includes industries that may produce some cultural goods in the sense used above, 
but where industry output also involves the production of non-cultural goods – that is, 
the proportion of ‘core’ cultural goods is lower than in the creative arts. Throsby here 
is addressing essentially the same point identified by both Bilton and Leary (What can 
managers do) and Martin (Defining Culture). However, while they argue that it is 
possible to define precisely whether a good is cultural or functional, Throsby’s 
argument recognises that for many goods it may be difficult to ascertain the 
proportions of cultural and functional value. 
One example of this would be architecture, where the design of buildings may make 
cultural statements that extend beyond purely functional aspects. We would then have 
to decide what proportion of this output is ‘cultural’ as opposed to ‘functional’. 
Similarly, advertising and design may produce genuinely cultural statements, and the 
value created is both cultural and non-cultural. Clearly the balance is extremely 
difficult to identify.  
 
Terminological Clutter  
However, difficulty in identifying the balance between the cultural and functional 
output of any commodity is not the only problem here – a second arises from 
terminological clutter. We discussed earlier how the use of the term culture has 
broadened over time. This has now created the problem that it has become increasingly 
difficult to agree on where to draw the line. 
For example, Flew (“Beyond ad hocery” 13) discusses the way in which the use of the 
term has been extended over time, and points to the definitional problems that this 
creates. If we define cultural industries as those involved in the production of symbolic 
goods and services, he asks whether it is now “possible to exclude any activity of 
industrial production that has a symbolic content? Is the design and production of a 
Coca-Cola can a part of the cultural industry” (Flew 13).  
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The problem arises from the way in which the term itself is now increasingly used in 
an anthropological sense to describe aspects of everyday life. Flew argues that this 
development has its roots in the notion that culture (in this sense) is becoming an 
increasingly important part of everyday life, particularly with regard to consumption of 
goods and services – consumers are argued to use increasingly commodities to 
construct a personal identity, a process which Lash and Urry (Economies 61) call “the 
semiotisation of everyday life”. So,  
Culture is thus recast from a distinct sphere of social life to something 
that permeates everything, from the design of urban spaces, offices, 
means of transport and communication … to the promotional 
strategies of corporations and increasingly governments (Flew 2). 
Used in this sense, we might equally conclude that ‘everything is cultural’ and that the 
term is used in such a wide sense that it is impossible to assign it any actual meaning. 
 
Production Methods 
The importance of production methods to an understanding of the cultural industries 
was first identified by Adorno, who distinguished between those cultural industries 
that employ industrial technology and modes of organisation to produce and distribute 
cultural goods and services, which are themselves produced by largely traditional or 
pre-industrial means (such as books and records), and those where the cultural form is 
industrial (such as newspapers, films and television programmes) (see Garnham). 
It is often a combination of symbolic meaning and industrial-scale production methods 
that is understood to characterise the cultural industries (Garnham; Hesmondhalgh). 
This definition produces a list of what are often regarded as the ‘classic’ cultural 
industries, namely film, broadcasting, publishing and recorded music. Towse (Cultural 
Industries 170) describes the cultural industries as those which ‘mass-produce goods 
and services with sufficient artistic content to be considered creatively and culturally 
significant. The essential features are industrial-scale production combined with 
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cultural content’. Reviewing the cultural economics literature of the 1990s, Towse 
notes that as the ‘creative arts’ do not employ industrial-scale production methods, 
they are typically excluded from definitions of the cultural industries deployed by 
cultural economists.  
For Hesmondhalgh (The Cultural Industries 12) ‘the core cultural industries deal with 
the industrial production and circulation of texts (the production of social meaning) 
and are centrally reliant on the work of symbol creators’ (his term for artists). 
Hesmondhalgh’s list of core cultural industries therefore excludes the creative arts, but 
includes: advertising and marketing, broadcasting, film industries, internet industry, 
music industries: recording, publishing and live performance, print and publishing 
including books, video and computer games. For Hesmondhalgh the creative arts – 
including drama and visual arts – are ‘peripheral’ cultural industries; while they are 
centrally concerned with the production of texts (symbolic meaning), they use semi-
industrial or non-industrial methods of production. 
This understanding, based on industrial production methods, was the one on which 
UNESCO based its enquiry into the cultural industries in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Significantly, UNESCO placed the issue of political and economic control of 
the technological and industrial production of culture central to the question of cultural 
development, particularly in developing countries. There is therefore a direct line 
between UNESCO’s early analysis of cultural industries and current debates around 
the notion of ‘cultural rights’ and the protection of cultural diversity (UNESCO, 
Cultural Industries; Convention on the protection). This is based on an understanding 
of the distinctiveness of cultural goods and markets and the consequences of market 
failure. 
In light of the above discussion it should be clear that we doubt whether the production 
method is itself a sufficient basis on which to define those activities that produce 
culture. It is evident that either industrial or artisan methods can produce culture. For 
example, a stage production of Don Giovanni and Losey’s film of Don Giovanni are 
simply different ways of presenting the same Mozart opera – defining cultural 
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industries by production method simply loses sight of what is being produced. 
However, it is the mass character of production that allows cultural industries to 
dominate consumption, and the structure and organisation of these industries that 
raises issues of ‘gatekeeping’ and control (Grant and Wood; Caves). Production 
methods don’t define what culture is, but are crucial for explaining why these 
industries must be considered part of cultural and not just economic policy.  
 
Culture and the Knowledge Economy 
The increased use of the term culture in the anthropologic sense discussed above, and 
the absorption of the cultural industries within the wider creative industries agenda, are 
both related to increased interest in the so-called ‘knowledge economy’. Analysis of 
the knowledge economy suggests that competitive advantage is increasingly derived 
from investment in intangibles, particularly information. Such information may be 
functional or scientific, but certain of the trends discussed above (e.g. a more 
sophisticated consumer demand) have led to suggestions that knowledge-intensity is 
an increasingly important competitive device in a wide range of consumer markets. 
One information set that, it is argued, increasingly underlies competitive advantage in 
such markets is the anthropologic type of cultural information discussed earlier. 
Much has been written on how the knowledge economy affects the cultural and 
creative sectors (Flew; Cunningham). But what is most relevant for present purposes is 
that increased interest in leveraging the economic potential of knowledge is clearly a 
further reason why the distinctive aspects of the cultural sector have been subsumed 
within the wider creative industries agenda – culture is now viewed as just one more 
‘knowledge economy asset’.  
The key problem, once again, is that discussed earlier – the failure to distinguish 
between cultural and other creative activities. This failure causes, in a policy sense, 
two problems. Firstly, it means that we lose the ability to measure the actual 
contribution that cultural (i.e. symbolic) goods make within the knowledge economy 
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context. For example, we do not know whether advertising or opera, both designated 
as ‘creative’ industries, has the more significant economic effect. More significantly, 
conflating culture with other creative activities again fails to recognise the distinctive 
aspect of symbolic culture. We now turn to address this issue. 
 
Cultural Distinctiveness 
Two factors define the distinctiveness of cultural products, one political/ideological, 
the other economic. These factors differentiate cultural goods from the wider set of 
creative industries and have important consequences for public policy towards the 
cultural industries. 
 
Symbolic Ideas and Freedom of Expression 
We have argued above that cultural products are distinctive from other creative 
activities because they are about the production and circulation of symbolic ideas. 
Cultural activities thus play a central role in the freedom of human expression, and this 
provides a direct link to questions of democracy. Enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, is the principle that every citizen should have the 
ability, through cultural participation, to freely develop their personality, and take part 
in the exchange of ideas (UNESCO, Cultural Rights 9). For this reason, we find 
ourselves agreeing with Dworkin’s proposition that the state, through cultural policy, 
has a role in ensuring that the “complexity and depth of forms of life” are open to the 
population now and for the future (Dworkin 232). This notion of cultural expression as 
a fundamental aspect of human freedom also underpins the UN Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 
Convention on the Protection). 
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Market Failure in the Market for Culture 
The distinctiveness of cultural goods also has an important economic dimension, 
central to which are arguments that cultural markets suffer from various types of 
“market failure”. From the argument that arts and culture create both private and non-
private values comes the notion that art and culture create benefits both for those who 
consume them directly (by attending a cultural event) and for those who do not attend. 
The notion that market failure affects cultural markets has a long lineage in the cultural 
economics literature (Throsby and Withers). The argument is essentially that, because 
of the existence of non-private benefits, the market mechanism working alone will fail 
to provide the amount of culture that society actually wishes to consume, and, 
importantly, is willing to pay for. This is the force of the recent statement by Baumol 
and Peacock, when they argue that “the arts confer benefits that people will experience 
whether they pay or not” (A Manifesto 2). O’Hagan expresses the same point as 
follows: 
While the arts do provide a service that can be bought and sold in the 
market place… they also provide another benefit, a non-private 
benefit that cannot be sold in the market place. (O’Hagan 22). 
Viewed from this perspective, market failure is a key justification for post-war state 
support for the arts – indeed, the establishment of Arts Council of Great Britain, can be 
considered as a form of ‘nationalisation’ of the cultural economy. While currently 
unfashionable in this post-socialist free market era, market failure arguments are none 
the less robust; at least robust enough for the UK government to support the UN 
Convention on Cultural Diversity in October 2005. It appears that a gritty 
acknowledgement of its shortcomings runs alongside an official acceptance of the free 
market principle. 
These two aspects of cultural distinctiveness are crucially interlinked. Both the 
production and consumption of culture are severely restricted if left entirely to the 
market, and the ensuing limitation of the field of cultural participation and expression 
represents a significant democratic deficit both for individuals and society as a whole.  
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Recognising these distinctive characteristics of culture provides us with clear grounds 
on which to distinguish cultural industries from the wider notion of creative industries. 
Cultural activities, whose primary purpose is to communicate symbolic ideas and 
meanings, play a central role in our ability to communicate and thus in the freedom of 
human expression. The same cannot be said of industries such as fashion design, 
whose prime purpose is to persuade people to buy certain types of clothing, or 
advertising, whose prime purpose is to simply persuade people to buy more. The key 
outputs of the cultural industry are not found in other parts of the creative industries, 
however defined, and it is this distinctive contribution that is lost by policy stances 
which subsume cultural creation within the wider creative agenda. 
 
Definitions in UK Policy 
Government interest in the ‘creative industries’ appears to stem from a belief that the 
UK has a strong track record in areas where individual creativity is important (in 
industries such as film and music), that the ‘creative industries’ have enjoyed high 
economic growth rates, and that this ‘creativity’ can be applied to the rest of the 
economy. 
As we have seen, the highly influential DCMS definition of creative industries is based 
on two of the concepts discussed above: creativity and intellectual property. Scottish 
Enterprise (SE) in its ‘Creative Industries Cluster Strategy’ also uses the DCMS 
definition. When defining ‘creative industries’, SE (Creativity and Enterprise 4) 
advances the notion that ‘creative industries are those in which creativity 
fundamentally is the enterprise’. This could include any industry, however, and the 
meaning of the ‘creative industries’ is, to say the least, difficult to pin down. It is 
clearly extremely difficult, on the basis of the definition supplied by SE, to know the 
extent to which these industries are ‘creative industries’ and thus to develop an 
appropriate set of policy responses. It may include those specified by SE but, if the 
criterion for entry is that ‘creativity fundamentally is the enterprise’, then, as discussed 
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above, we could equally well include a range of other industries (see also Bilton and 
Leary 50).  
The problem is that, while the cultural industries can be defined as those that generate 
symbolic meaning (as we have seen above), official definitions of the ‘creative 
industries’ make no reference to symbolic meaning and could involve any type of 
creative activity. Individual creativity could equally well include developing scientific 
innovations, yet industries that develop these are not typically included in definitions 
of the creative sector. The difficulty in identifying specific types of ‘individual 
creativity’ makes it very difficult to decide which industries are ‘creative’. Most 
importantly, in defining creative industries on the basis of creativity and intellectual 
property, the UK approach also fails to consider the nature of cultural creativity and 
so, as argued above, also loses sight of the distinctive public good contribution of 
culture. 
Significantly, the UK’s ‘knowledge economy’ approach contrasts strongly with the 
definitions of cultural goods and services and of cultural industries proposed by 
UNESCO (Convention on the Protection). These combine the concepts of creativity 
and intellectual property with a strong emphasis on the importance of symbolic 
meaning, which means that cultural goods ‘embody or convey cultural expressions, 
irrespective of the commercial value they may have.’ (UNESCO, Convention on the 
Protection 5) 
 
Conclusions  
In short, why does this matter? Well definitions matter because they have implications 
for theory, policy and its practical application. These issues raise questions for cultural 
policy in the UK and elsewhere. Critical examination of the British government 
definition of creative industries reveals a lack of theoretical clarity. If the creative 
industries, by definition, have no cultural content, then we have to ask, is this an error, 
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or have the distinctive attributes of culture been purposely overlooked by the UK 
government in favour of a knowledge economy approach?  
It is hard to tell. But it was interesting to see the UK government supporting the UN 
Convention Protecting Cultural Diversity in October 2005. The Convention is founded 
on a definition of cultural goods and services developed with the advice of David 
Throsby, that has symbolic meaning at its heart. It is therefore in direct contradiction 
to the official UK creative industries definition. Was that a change of heart, or just a 
pragmatic vote for Britain’s economic interests? 
If the UK government does not recognise the distinctiveness of culture and cultural 
creativity, as the creative industries definition suggests, then does this also apply to 
government cultural policy? The creative industries agenda is one to which the UK 
Arts Councils and other cultural agencies are required to contribute. These agencies 
have intervened in the cultural economy for many years, but with cultural objectives. 
At a practical level, if not at a policy or rhetorical level, can these motivations be 
maintained or will they necessarily be over-ridden by economic concerns?  
On the one hand government interest in the creative industries has clearly benefitted 
some aspects of the arts through the prioritisation of support for artistic production. 
But alongside an acknowledgement of these gains, is the view that in the longer run 
culture may be being repositioned and with it the established arguments for cultural 
funding. 
If the essence of culture is the production and circulation of symbolic meaning or ideas 
– then there is a clear link to questions of democracy. The right to develop ourselves 
through cultural expression and participation are recognised as fundamental human 
rights. From this recognition flows a clear role for government cultural policy. But this 
is not acknowledged or addressed by the creative industries paradigm. 
Similarly the generation and communication of ideas within society is arguably 
restricted if left entirely to the market. Market failure has been an important 
justification of government support for the arts in post war Britain. The cultural 
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industries concept took this on, arguing for a cultural policy for industry or, 
alternatively, an industrial policy informed by cultural objectives. However the 
creative industries agenda ignores this. In our view, without an acceptance of cultural 
distinctiveness the whole context in which government support is debated and assessed 
is altered and an understanding of the public benefits of culture, those that cannot be 
captured by markets, may be diminished. 
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